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INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN SUBJECT
RESEARCH: IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF
OBTAINING INFORMED CONSENT FROM
MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
Dorothy Derrickson*
Introduction
Greg signed the informed consent provided by his doctor, and
required for participation in the clinical research protocol.1 Greg
suffers, however, from schizophrenia, a disease that causes de-
creased cognitive abilities.2 As a result, he did not understand that
when the informed consent form stated his condition might im-
prove, worsen or change, it meant that he may be taken off of his
medication and experience schizophrenic relapse.'
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University, 1998; A.B., University of Delaware,
1994. Senior Articles Editor, FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL.
1. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-117 (1997). Research conducted for the Food and
Drug Administration follows regulations similar to the Department of Health and
Human Service's regulations on the Protection of Human Subjects. See 21 C.F.R.
H 50.20-.27. This Note will discuss only the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices regulations.
2. Schizophrenia involves a range of cognitive dysfunctions. See AM. PSYCHIAT-
RIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 274 (4th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
3. This anecdote is based upon a study that occurred at U.C.L.A. in 1989 and was
widely criticized by the medical ethics field. See James Willwerth, Madness in Fine
Print, TIME, Nov. 7, 1994, at 62; see also Philip J. Hilts, Agency Faults a U.C.L.A.
Study for Suffering of Mental Patients, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1994, at Al; James
Willwerth, Tinkering with Madness, TIME, Aug. 30, 1993, at 40. Gregory Aller, a sub-
ject in the study entered the second phase of the study on June 1, 1989. See Willwerth,
Tinkering with Madness, supra, at 40-41. According to Aller, he began to suffer from
relapse in October. See id. at 41. On January 15, Aller threatened his mother with a
knife. See id. at 41-42. He tried to get to Washington, D.C. to kill President Bush
because the voices in his head told him Bush was about to launch a nuclear attack on
Russia in order to confuse the space aliens. See id. at 42. It was not until nine months
after his relapse that he resumed taking anti-psychotic medication. See Hilts, supra, at
B10.
The study's goal was to better identify factors that cause some persons to be more
prone to schizophrenic relapse in order to develop "preventive intervention strategies
in the future." Problems in Securing Informed Consent of Subjects in Experimental
Trials of Unapproved Drugs and Devices: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Regu-
lation, Business Opportunities, and Technology of the House Committtee on Small
Business, 103rd Cong. 43 (1994) (statement of Don A. Rockwell, M.D., Director,
Neuropsychiatric Hospital, University -of California, Los Angeles) [hereinafter
Rockwell Tesimony].
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The federal regulations regarding research involving human sub-
jects provide extra protections for some vulnerable populations,4
but do not provide adequate informed consent protection for men-
tally ill persons. Patients like Greg may remain completely una-
ware of the true implications of the study; they provide their
consent but fail to meaningfully understand the protocol.
The doctrine of informed consent has been debated and ana-
lyzed by numerous scholars.5 This Note focuses on one aspect of
the process: to ensure a participant can provide meaningful in-
formed consent.6 This Note demonstrates that the federal regula-
tions regarding human subject research must provide more specific
guidelines that emphasize the process of obtaining informed con-
sent from persons with mental illnesses. Part I discusses schizo-
phrenia as a case example of a mental illness that requires more
stringent informed consent standards in human subject research,
detailing the nature of schizophrenia and the diagnostic process.
Part II describes the legal foundations of informed consent to
After the study, some of the patients stated that they were not warned about the
severity of the potential relapse they could experience. The National Institute of
Health's Office for the Protection of Research Risks ("OPRR") investigated the
study and reported that it did not comply with the federal regulations since the extent
of the risks taken by patients and the fact that ordinary treatment would be a safer
course for most of the patients were not disclosed to the subjects. See Hilts, supra, at
B10. Even though OPRR criticized some aspects of the study, it "found 'no demon-
strable basis for rejecting the U.C.L.A. IRB's determination that the design of the
[study] is scientifically and ethically justifiable."' Rockwell Testimony, supra (quoting
OPRR Report at 17 (May 11, 1994)). In response to the criticisms advanced by the
OPRR, U.C.L.A. added information to the consent forms that previously was
presented orally, and included additional information about the risks and procedures
of the study. See id.
4. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-46.409 (1995).
5. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMEN-
TATION (1977); PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT (1987); RUTH R.
FADEN TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
(1986); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT ch.3(1984) [herein-
after THE SILENT WORLD]; ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATIONS OF
CLINICAL RESEARCH (1986); Bartolo, Tales of Informed Consent: Four Years on an
Institutional Review Board, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 193 (1992); Jesse A. Goldner, An
Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regulatory Implica-
tions of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63 (1993); Jay Katz,
Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 7 (1993).
6. This Note further develops and analyzes the basic proposition advanced by
Anne J. Ryan in True Protection for Persons with Severe Mental Disabilities, Such as
Schizophrenia, Involved as Subjects in Research? A Look and Consideration of the
"Protection of Human Subjects", 9 J.L. & HEALTH 349 (1994-95). Ms. Ryan recom-
mended regulations that would provide true consent to persons with mental disabili-
ties, by creating a separate section to the federal regulations for mentally disabled
persons.
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human experimentation and the-current federal regulations for
human subject research. Part III examines the inadequacy of cur-
rent federal regulations for mentally ill research subjects and pro-
poses revisions to ensure that mentally ill persons provide
adequate informed consent to participate in research. This Note
concludes that when the potential subject is a person with schizo-
phrenia, the process of obtaining informed consent should require
a conversation between the physician-investigator and the poten-
tial subject in the presence of a third party patient advocate.7
I. The Special Problem of Schizophrenia and Informed Consent
The diagnostic criteria8 and the nature and course of schizophre-
nia exemplify why the informed consent process for schizophrenic
research subjects can be problematic. Schizophrenia is a disease
that affects cognition; it disrupts a person's perceptual and emo-
tional abilities.9 Some schizophrenics experience a relatively
7. This Note will focus only on schizophrenia, and does not delve into other dis-
orders. Also, this Note discusses persons who are deemed to be competent to give
informed consent. The discussion of incompetent person is too broad for the scope of
this Note.
This Note also concentrates on the informed consent process for schizophrenics in
non-therapeutic research, as opposed to therapeutic treatment. The conversation this
Note proposes is aimed at the informed consent process for the potential subject to
participate in the study, not a conversation regarding enrollment in the study.
8. The DSM-IV requires that the person must experience "a disturbance that
lasts for at least six months and includes at least one month of active-phase symp-
toms". DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 274. There are six diagnostic criteria in the DSM-
IV. DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 285-86. Criterion A requires that at least two of five
characteristics (hallucinations, delusions, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or
catatonic behavior, and negative symptoms) be present "for a significant portion of
time during a 1-month period". Id. at 285. The second criterion requires that a major
area of functioning (interpersonal relations, work, or self-care) are markedly under
the person's normal level prior to onset for a significant amount of time since the
disturbance began. See id. Criterion C requires that the symptoms be present for at
least six months, including a period of one month in which the person has symptoms
that meet Criterion A. See id. Criteria D, E and F rule out the disorder being mis-
diagnosed as a mood disorder, schizoaffective disorder, due to drug abuse or medica-
tion, or pervasive developmental disorder. See id. at 285-86.
9. Schizophrenia is part of a set of psychotic disorders characterized by major
disruptions "in thought, emotion, and behavior - disordered thinking in which ideas
are not logically related; faulty perception and attention, bizarre disturbances in mo-
tor activity; and flat or inappropriate affect." GERALD C.. DAVISON & JOHN M.
NEALE, ABNORMAL PsYCHOLOGY, 389 (6th ed. 1996) [hereinafter DAVISON &
NEALE]. Schizophrenia consists of various symptoms that can be classified into posi-
tive and negative symptoms. See id.; DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 273. Positive symp-
toms "include distortions or exaggerations of inferential thinking (delusions),
perception (hallucinations), language and communication (disorganized speech), and
monitoring (grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior)." Id. at 274-75. Negative
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steady path, but others continually worsen.'0 Even though schizo-
phrenia usually follows a chronic course, antipsychotic medication
can improve a patient's condition." The side effects of schizo-
phrenic drugs, however, leave most individuals in an altered state.'2
As a result, a person suffering from schizophrenia may be legally
competent, 3 but have impaired cognitive abilities.'"
Studies illustrate that the cognitive deficits of schizophrenia
greatly affect the ability of subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia
to understand and appreciate the true nature of the research's pro-
tocol. One study found that persons with schizophrenia demon-
strate more pronounced and consistent impairments in ability to
reason, appreciate, and understand than persons not diagnosed
with schizophrenia.15 The effects of schizophrenia produced two
problems during the informed consent process: persons with schiz-
ophrenia "demonstrated poor understanding of scientific rationales
symptoms restrict the extent "of emotional expression (affective flattening), in the
fluency and productivity of thought and speech (algogia), and in the initiation of goal
directed behavior (avolition)." Id. at 275.
10. See DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 282. It is rare for a person with this disorder to
have a complete remission. See id.
11. See id. at 281.
12. See id. The drugs given to schizophrenics are called "antipsychotic medica-
tions" and "neuroleptics" because the drugs produce side effects similar to neurolep-
tic disorders. DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 9, at 414. A new drug, clozapine, can
cause damage to the immune system and prosuce seizures. See id. at 415.
13. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Compe-
tence Study, 19 LAW & HuM. BEHAV., 105, 111 (1995); see also LEVINE, supra note 5,
at 261-62.
14. See DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 274.
15. See Paul Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Study III, Abilities of
Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HuM. BEHAV.,
149,' 173 (1995) [hereinafter The MacArthur Study]. The MacArthur Study investi-
gated the ability of mentally ill patients to make decisions about their treatment. .See
id. at 149. The study found that persons with schizophrenia demonstrate more pro-
nounced and consistent impairments in ability to reason, appreciate and understand
than persons not diagnosed with schizophrenia. See id. at 169. The more severe the
symptoms of schizophrenia, the poorer the performance was in understanding and
reasoning, especially in patients with thought disturbances. See id.
The MacArthur Study was published as three papers. The first paper explored
what is known about how mental illnesses can affect decision-making abilities and
described the design of the MacArthur Study. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso,
MacArthur Study I, Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAw &
HuM. BEHAV. 105 (1995). The MacArthur Study Part II described the measures de-
veloped for the study to assess a person's ability to understand, appreciate, reason,
and express a choice. Thomas Grisso, et al., MacArthur Study II, Measures of Abilities
Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 127, (1995).
The third paper reported the results of the study.
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and procedures and frequently perceived research participation in
therapeutic and personalized terms."' 6
. This study suggested that using a third-party investigator suc-
ceeded over unassisted investigator disclosures in transmitting
high-quality information about the research to potential subjects.17
The MacArthur study suggested that the investigator should assess
the potential subject's ability to reason, understand, and appreciate
the significance of the information presented to the patient.18 In-
formation disclosed part by part, rather than information disclosed
as, a whole, resulted in much greater understanding. 19
H. The Development of The Law of Informed Consent to
Human Experimentation And The Current
Federal Guidelines
Informed consent in clinical research occupies an important role
in safeguarding the rights and autonomy of human research sub-
jects. In the area of research on human subjects, the informed con-
sent doctrine first gained attention in international treatises that set
forth the basic ethical principles (a person must provide voluntary,
informed, competent, and knowledgeable consent to participate in
the experiment) but lacked legal enforceability.2" The United
States codified these principles in federal regulations designed to
protect persons in research studies at institutions that received fed-
eral funding for research.2'
16. Paul R. Benson, et al., Information Disclosure, Subject Understanding, and In-
formed Consent in Psychiatric Research: 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 455, 471 (1988)
[hereinafter The Benson Study]. Many factors were significantly related to the sub-
jects' comprehension of information. See id. The severity of impairment and the psy-
chiatric diagnosis were high predictors of the subject's ability to understand the
research, with schizophrenics "significantly more likely than others to display poor
comprehension." Id.
The Benson Study examined whether and to what extent innovative disclosure
methods affect the quality and quantity of information given to potential research
subjects, and whether psychopathology, the quality of disclosed information, and soci-
odemographic factors can best explain variations in the understanding of the potential
subjects. The study used four different disclosure techniques to analyze how different
disclosure methods affect comprehension of information. See id. at 457-58.
17. See id. at 473.
18. See The MacArthur Study, supra note 15, at 173.
19. See id. Therefore, a patient who may seem to not be able to understand the
information at first, may benefit from additional explanations. See id.
20. See THE NUREMBERG CODE, reprinted in, LEVINE, supra note 5, at 425.
21. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-24 (1996). The federal regulations require
institutions to apply the regulations to department funded research, and to review
research even if not funded by the government. See id. at 46.103. Most institutions
inform the Department of their intention to follow the process detailed in the regula-
1997]
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A. The Law of Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent evolved from judicial defer-
ence to individual autonomy,22 and demonstrates the American ju-
dicial belief that the right to be free of unwanted interference
belongs to every person.23 The doctrine also stems from the West-
ern belief in the importance of personal freedom and choice.24
The common law action for lack of informed consent developed
through case law involving therapeutic physician-patient relation-
ships.25 The doctrine of informed consent arose from the common
law action of battery, and eventually developed into an action
based in negligence.26 Under negligence theory, a doctor has a
duty to provide the patient with the information required by the
relevant standard of disclosure,27 including a description of the di-
agnosis, the nature and purpose of the treatment, the risks of the
treatment and the probabilities of the risks occurring.28 The doctor
must also disclose alternative methods of treatment, and the at-
tendant risks and probabilities.29
The first standard of disclosure adopted by the courts to test the
adequacy of the physician's disclosure was physician-based. 30 This
standard measures the physician's duty to disclose by the disclosure
that would be made by a reasonable physician in similar circum-
tions for all human research studies. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW
551 (1995). Since practically every institution in the United States conducts some re-
search that receives federal funds, the regulations essentially govern all research in-
volving human subjects. See id.
22. "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Schloendorff v. Soc. of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 (1914);
See also Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906) (holding that the physician may not
violate a person's bodily integrity without the patient's permission or operate on the
patient without the patient's knowledge and consent).
23. See generally FURROW, supra note 21, at 409.
24. See FADEN, supra note 5, at 7.
25. See id. at 25. The doctrine of "informed consent" appeared for the first time in
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. of Trustees when the court stated that "[a] physician
violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the
proposed treatment." 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal.App. 1957).
26. See Williams v. Cordice 418 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996-97, 100 Misc. 2d 425, 426-29
(App. Div. 2d Dept. 1979).
27. See FADEN, supra note 5, at 29. In addition, the injury must be a materializa-
tion of an undisclosed outcome, the patient would not have consented if the informa-
tion was disclosed, and crucially, the non-disclosure caused the injury. See id.
28. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1994).
29. See id.
30. See Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 670, 671 (1960).
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stances.31 In recent years, some states adopted the "reasonable pa-
tient" standard.32 This standard shifts the focus away from the
physician by relying on the information a reasonable person needs
to know about the risks, benefits, and alternatives. 33 A third stan-
dard, the subjective patient standard, is not embraced by the
courts.34 This standard requires a physician to disclose information
material to that particular patient.
31. Over twenty-five states utilize this standard through statute or judicial deci-
sion. See, e.g., Fain v. Smith, 497 So.2d 1150, 1152 (AIA. 1985); McGrady v. Wright,
729 P.2d 338, 341 (ArIz. 1986); Aronson v. Harriman, 901 S.W.2d 832, 839 (Ark.
1995); Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P.2d 89,91 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Baylis v. Wilmington
Med. Ctr., 477 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Supreme 1984); Ritz v. Florida Patient's Comp.
Fund, 436 So.2d 987, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667.
672-73 (Hawaii 1995); Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d 452, 462 (Idaho 1991); Coryell v.
Smith, 274 Ill.App.3d 543, 546 (I11. App. Ct. 1995); Kranda v. Houser-Norbotg Med.
Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Wozniak v. Lipoff, 750 P.2d 971,
982 (Kan. 1988); Gregory v. Poor, 862 F. Supp. 171, 173 (W.D. Ky. 1994); Ouellette v.
Mehalic, 534 A.2d 1331, 1332 (Me. 1988); Howell v. Outerdrive Hosp., 238 N.W.2d
553, 557 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Herrington v. Spell, 692 So.2d 93, 97 (Miss. 1997);
Robinson v. Bleicher, 599 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Neb. 1997); Smith v. Cotter, 810 P.2d
1204, 1207 (Nev. 1991); Marchione v. State, 194 A.D.2d 851. 853, 598 N.Y.S.2d 592,
593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Clark v Perry, 442 S.E.2d 57, 62 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Baxley v. Rosenblum, 400 S.E.2d 502, 508 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); Cradwell v. Bechtol,
724 S.W.3d 739,751 (Tenn. 1987); Macey v. James, 427 A.2d 803, 804 (Vt. 1981); Rizzo
v. Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. 1994); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 423-24
(Wyo. 1962).
32. See, e.g., Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Alaska 1993); Arato v.
Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 604 (Cal. 1993); Gemme v. Goldberg, 626 A.2d 318, 327 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1993); Cleary v. Group Health Ass'n, 691 A.2d 148, 153 (D.C. 1997);
Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 1987); Zeller v.
Greater Baltimore Med. Ctr., 506 A.2d 646, 651 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Feeley v.
Baer, 669 N.E.2d 456, 459-60 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d
684, 701 (Minn. 1977); Herrignton v. Spell, 692 So.2d 93, 97 (Miss. 1997); Adamski v.
Moss, 638 A.2d 1360, 1363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); Patterson v. Van Wiel,
570 P.2d 931, 933-34 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977); Bedel v. Univ. of Cincinnati Hosp., 669
N.E.2d 9, 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Goss v. Oklahoma Blood Inst., 856 P.2d 998, 1006-
07 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990); Nogowski v. Alemo-Hammad, 691 A.2d 950, 957 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I. 1972); Wheeldon v.
Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 376 (S.D. 1985); Tajchman v. Giller, 938 S.W.2d 95, 100
(Tex. App. 1996); Villanueva v. Harrigton, 906 P.2d 374, 376 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995);
Adams v. El-Bash, 388 S.E.2d 381, 386 (W. Va. 1985); Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor,
545 N.W.2d 495, 501 (Wis. 1996).
33. See FURROW, supra note 21, at 414.
34. See id. at 415.
35. See FADEN, supra note 5, at 33 (citing Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 687
(R.I. 1972)). Proponents of this standard argue that since every person has a right to
make her own choices, one may require information that may not meet the "reason-
able person" level of materiality, yet is material to that particular person. See id. at
33-34. A reason for the courts reluctance is the belief that the patient will use hind-
sight to promote the concept that the undisclosed information was important to her
decision to undergo the treatment. See FURROW, supra note 21, at 415; FADEN, supra
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Courts have expanded the type of information and scope of dis-
closure required to satisfy the doctrine of informed consent in the
research setting. Early case law established that the duty of in-
formed consent on physicians in a research setting at least equals
the duty of informed consent on physicians in the therapeutic set-
ting.36 A researcher must disclose any information that might in-
fluence a patient's decision to participate37 and is liable for a
procedure or protocol performed on a person without that person's
consent.38 In addition, the physician-investigator has a duty to dis-
close to the patient the physician's research and economic interests
in the procedure.39
B. Informed Consent in Human Subject Research
Informed consent in the research setting developed not through
case law, but through political occurrences, regulatory agencies,
professional codes and statutes.4 °
The Nuremberg Code is the most comprehensive authoritative
declaration on the law of informed consent in the context of human
subject research.41 It developed as a condemnation of the actions
of Nazi physicians during World War 1142 and established ten prin-
ciples to guide experimentation on humans.43 Principle One states
that the consent of the subject must be voluntary, informed, and
note 5, at 33. In addition, opponents argue that this standard would impose a heavy
legal burden on physicians. See FADEN, supra note 5, at 33.
36. See Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 248 N.Y.S.2d 245, 42 Misc.2d 427
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); see also Halushka v. Univ. of Saskatchewan, 52 W.W.R. 608,
616-17 (Sask. 1965). A dissenting judge in Smith v. United States stated that during a
non-therapeutic experiment, the experimenter has a duty to fully inform the subject
and to obtain the subject's informed consent. 412 F.2d 791, 792 (9th Cir. 1969) (Huf-
stedler, C.J., dissenting). For a detailed discussion of cases involving informed con-
sent in therapeutic and non-therapeutic settings see Goldner, supra note 5, at 77-87.
37. See Hyman, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 245, 42 Misc. at 427.
38. See Schwartz v. Boston Hosp. for Women, 422 F. Supp. 53, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
see also, Blanton v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
39. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,793 P.2d 479, 496 (Cal. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
40. See APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 211.
41. See THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 20.
42. See ANNAS, supra note 5, at 6; FADEN, supra note 5, at 153. The Nazi war
crimes revealed that several leading German physicians forced subjects that were
picked from the concentration camps "to drink seawater or breathe mustard gas, were
exposed to such epidemics as malaria, jaundice, and typhus, or were placed in ice
water until they froze." FURROW, supra note 21, at 546; See FADEN, supra note 5, at
153. The Nuremberg Court condemned their actions as crimes against humanity. See
FURROW, supra note 21, at 547.
43. See THE NUREMBERO CODE, supra note 20.
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competent." The subject must also comprehend the nature of the
research.45 The Nuremberg Code fails to describe what method an
investigator must use to obtain informed consent, or how to ex-
plain and define the risks to the potential subject.46
The Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the World Medical As-
sociation in 1964, elaborated on the Nuremberg Code.47 Central to
the Declaration of Helsinki was the requirement of written consent
in all cases of non-therapeutic research.48 It also acknowledged
that special protections are needed for mentally ill persons, minors,
and institutionalized persons.49 The Nuremberg Code and The
Declaration of Helsinki are considered customary international
law, neither binding on United States courts nor relied on as per-
suasive authority. 0
Society's outrage over a series of biomedical abuses 51 led to Con-
gress' enactment of the National Research Act in 1974,52 establish-
ing the National Commission for Protection of Human Subject of
44. See id. at Principal One. "The voluntary consent of the Human subject is abso-
lutely essential." Id. The Nuremberg Code also provides that the study should be
scientifically and socially necessary, based on the results of animal or other non-
human experimentation, should avoid unnecessary suffering and injury, the doctor
must be willing to terminate the experiment at any stage if it is appropriate to protect
the subject, and the subject must be able to withdraw at any time without penalty. See
id. at Principles Two, Three, Four, Nine, and Ten. See also Id. at Principles Five, Six,
Seven, and Eight.
45. See id. at Principle One.
46. The Nuremberg Court believed that those conclusions were out of its sphere.
See FADEN, supra note 5, at 155.
47. See FURROW, supra note 21, at 548. The Declaration of Helsinki was drafted in
response to the medical community's perceived threat to the reputation of research as
a result of the violations investigated at the Nuremberg Trials. See FADEN supra note
5, at 156. The World Medical Association drafted the document to further "distin-
guish ethical from unethical clinical research." Id.
48. See World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations
Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (re-
printed in LEVINE, supra note 5, at 427) (hereinafter DECLARATION OF HELSINKI).
49. See FURROW, supra note 21, at 548.
50. See id. at 9.
51. For example, the Tuskegee Study was supported by the United States Public
Health Service, and studied the course of syphilis. See FURROW, supra note 21, at 548.
Starting in 1932, poor, African-Americans were injected with syphilis without their
consent. See id. Even when penicillin was developed to treat syphilis, the men were
denied and discouraged from seeking any treatment. See id. at 549. The experiment
was uncovered in 1972, and was the topic of Congressional hearings in 1973. See id.
The public was also disturbed by the possibility of research on human fetuses. See
FADEN, supra note 5, at 215. These developments led to public hostility and distrust
of medical research. See id.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1995).
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Biomedical and Behavioral Research ("Commission").53 The
Commission conducted an extensive investigation to identify fun-
damental ethical principles to guide research involving human sub-
jects.54 The Commission also studied the ethics of research on
vulnerable populations, including the mentally handicapped, pris-
oners, and pregnant women.5 5 However, its recommendations con-
cerning protections for the mentally ill were not incorporated into
the federal regulations,56 due to opposition from researchers of
mental illnesses.57
The Commission issued its findings in the Belmont Report which
stated "that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents
and.., that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to pro-
tection."5 8 In addition, The Belmont Report stated that the infor-
mation disclosed to a research subject must include the anticipated
risks and benefits, the research procedure, the purpose, alternative
procedures, the opportunity for the potential subject to ask ques-
tions, and the ability to withdraw at any time.5 9 The Commission
acknowledged that a simple listing of the items required by the reg-
ulations does not ensure informed consent.60 The manner and con-
text of the information conveyed must be adapted to the capacities
of the potential subject.6' The report acknowledged expressly that
respect for persons requires that people with limited comprehen-
53. See FURROW, supra note 21, at 549.
54. See id.
55. See FADEN, supra note 5, at 215-16. The Commission was also to investigate
the IRB system, and procedures for informed consent. See id. at 216.
56. See APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 228; LEVINE, supra note 5, at 271-72.
57. See APPELBAUM, supra note 5, at 228. These physicians claimed that the pro-
posed protections would substantially hamper research on mental illnesses, and that
mentally ill persons were not any more vulnerable than persons with serious physical
illnesses. See id.
58. NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDI-
CAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 10
(1978) [hereinafter THE BELMONT REPORT]. THE BELMONT REPORT promulgated
three basic principles regarding the ethics of research upon human beings: "the princi-
ples of respect for persons, beneficence and justice." Id. at 4.
59. See id. at 11. THE BELMONT REPORT analyzed informed consent in three parts
information, comprehension, and voluntariness. See id. at 10. It also provided that
the risks to the patient should never be unrevealed because otherwise the patient may
not participate. See id. at 11-12.
60. See id. at 11.
61. See id. at 12.
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sive abilities, such as children and the mentally ill, must have the
opportunity to choose whether to participate in the study.62
The Nuremberg Code 63 and The Declaration of Helsinki64 pro-
vided the ethical foundations on which American legislators relied
when they promulgated regulations for human research subjects.6 5
The federal regulations provide specific standards for obtaining in-
formed consent from each potential subject.66 The regulations ap-
ply "to all research involving human subjects" that is supported or
conducted by a federal department or agency.67 Research that is
not supported or conducted by a federal department or agency, but
occurs at an institution which receives department funding, must
be reviewed to ascertain its appropriateness for human subjects.68
The investigator must allow the subject to ask questions, and
must present the information to the person "in language under-
standable to the subject. ' 69 The regulations list eight basic ele-
ments of informed consent:70 "[a] statement that the study involves
research; an explanation of the purposes of the research and the
expected duration of the subject's participation; a description of
the procedures to be followed, and the identification of any proce-
dures which are experimental;"'7 1 descriptions of any reasonably
foreseeable risks,72 benefits, 73 and alternative treatments avail-
able;74 an explanation that participation is voluntary and consent
may be withdrawn at any time without penalty; 75 a description of
the extent of confidentiality with respect to the patient's records;76
an explanation of the proper person to contact for questions about
the research and whom to contact in the event of an injury;77 and
62. See id. at 13. The third element of informed consent, voluntariness, requires
that a subject provides consent without any element of coercion and "undue influ-
ence." Id. at 14.
63. See THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 20.
64. See DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 48, at 429.
65. See ANNAS, supra note 5, at 6-9.
66. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. The Department of Health and Human Services codi-
fied the regulations on human subject research at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101- 46.409. (1995).
The statutory authority for the regulations is located at 42 U.S.C. § 300v-1(b).
67. Id. at 46.101.
68. See id.
69. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
70. See id.
71. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1).
72. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2).
73. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3).
74. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4).
75. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8).
76. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(5).
77. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(7).
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finally, an explanation by the researcher of any compensation and
medical treatments available to the subject when the study involves
more than a minimal risk.78
Informed consent must be documented in writing by the re-
searcher. 79 The regulations provide two different methods of ob-
taining informed consent: a short form and a long form. 80 In the
long form, the investigator gives the patient "a written document
that embodies the elements of informed consent. ' 81 The short
form provides for a written document declaring that the elements
of informed consent have been read to the subject with a witness
present, and a summary of that information signed by the subject.82
Each institution must establish Institutional Review Boards
("IRBs") in accordance with the regulations.83 An IRB contains at
least five persons of varying backgrounds "to promote complete
and adequate review of research activities commonly conducted by
the institution. ' 84 To approve research, the IRB must make seven
findings: the risks to the subject are minimized; the risks are rea-
sonable in relation to the anticipated benefits to the subject; the
selection of the subjects is equitable; informed consent is obtained;
informed consent will be appropriately documented; the safety of
the subjects will be provided for by monitoring the data, when ap-
propriate; and the privacy and confidentiality of the patient is pro-
tected, when appropriate.85 The regulations do not provide specific
guidelines for implementing and monitoring these safeguards.
The federal regulations enunciate additional requirements for
conducting research upon certain categories of human subjects, in-
78. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6).
79. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(a).
80. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(b)(1)&(2).
81. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(b)(1).
82. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(b)(2).
83. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b). A list of the IRB members and the written proce-
dures the IRB will follow must also be submitted to the department or agency. See id.
at § 46.103(b).
84. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). The only restriction upon IRB membership is that one
person on the IRB must not be affiliated with the institution. See id. at § 46.107(d).
As a result, most of the members of an institution's IRB are members of that institu-
tion's faculty. See Katz, supra note 5, at 40-41.
85. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111. Public access to IRB records can be limited. Even
though they are established under a federal regulation, the Freedom of Information
Act does not apply to IRBs because they are not federal agencies within that defini-
tion. See FURROW, supra note 21, at 558. An IRB may be held negligent for failure to
exercise due care; immunity does not arise out of the federal law. See id. at 561.
However, no board member has been individually liable because of the board's deci-
sion. See id.
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cluding fetuses, pregnant women, prisoners, and children.86 When
the study involves vulnerable subjects, the IRB can consider in-
cluding a person on the board who is knowledgeable in that area.87
Also, additional protections must be in place "to protect the rights
and welfare" of vulnerable persons in a study.88 No special guide-
lines outline the process for obtaining informed consent from the
mentally ill.
The federal regulations place a duty on the institution con-
ducting the experiment to protect the rights of the subjects, unlike
the Nuremberg Code which created principles applicable to re-
searchers.89 The institution cannot use federal funds if it fails to
comply with these regulations.90 The federal regulations do not
contain a right to a private cause of action, but "courts are likely to
perceive this [the IRB's] review as part of the ordinary standard of
care with respect to the conduct of any formal biomedical research
project." 91
I. Reforming the Federal Guidelines
Although the federal regulations provide some protections for
vulnerable classes of people, such as pregnant women, prisoners,
and children, 92 they do not provide specific protection for persons
with mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia. Since persons with
this illness suffer from impaired cognitive abilities, the federal reg-
ulations should provide protections for them during the informed
consent process.
86. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201 -.409. When the research involves fetuses, pregnant
women, and human in vitro fertilization, the institution must establish an Ethical Ad-
visory Board with persons selected who are competent to handle ethical, legal, medi-
cal and social issues. See id. § 46.204. With respect to prisoners, the federal
regulations provide protections due to the possibility that a prisoner's incarceration
may affect their ability to volunteer wholly uncoerced to participate in a study. See id.
§ 46.302. When the study involves children, the regulations specify guidelines for re-
search that involves various degrees of risk and benefit to the child. See id. §§ 46.404-
407.
87. See id. § 46.107(a).
88. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b). The regulations do not specify what these "addi-
tional protections" are. Listed among the possibility of vulnerable populations are
mentally disabled persons, pregnant women, children, prisoners, and economically or
educationally disadvantaged person. See id.
89. See Goldner, supra note 5, at 103.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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A. Problem of Lack of Process in Obtaining Informed Consent
The federal regulations' provision on informed consent fails to
provide adequate standards for the process of obtaining informed
consent from mentally ill persons, such as persons with schizophre-
nia. The regulations must obligate physician-investigators to ob-
tain informed consent in ways that produce true comprehension of
the experiment's protocol and the subject's role in the experiment.
Meaningful informed consent is not achieved by the potential sub-
ject reading a document and signing at the bottom of the page.
This emphasis on form over substance results in a meaningless sig-
nature on the consent form.
Currently, a researcher may obtain informed consent by using
the short form or long form method.93 The long form method is
insufficient because simply reading a long list of medical terms fails
to ensure that the potential subject comprehends his/her role and
the protocol of the study. In practice, many long form informed
consent forms contain unfamiliar and opaque terminology.94 The
short consent form is inadequate because it asks only a "witness"
to be present.95 The federal regulations fail to elaborate on the
identity and role of the witness. If the regulations identified the
role of the witness, mentally ill persons could receive more protec-
tion to ensure that they provide meaningful informed consent. The
present situation, in which the witness remains undefined, results
in an unexplored protection for mentally ill persons.
Investigators may not always include information about the
study's procedures, risks, benefits, and alternative treatments.96
An investigator may downplay the scientific aspects of the study
while emphasizing the therapeutic elements. 97 As a result, poten-
tial subjects may believe that the research's design aims to benefit
them personally, instead of benefitting science.98 For persons with
schizophrenia, who already face problems providing informed con-
sent due to the cognitive deficits of the disease, a conversation be-
tween -the investigator and the potential subject can help ensure
that the potential subject comprehends the risks and benefits of the
protocol. A conversation can help because when an investigator
93. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
94. See Bartolo, supra note 5, at 193, 200. For example, such terms as "dose limit-
ing toxicities, intrathecal injections, bone marrow aspiration, bilateral wedge and tes-
ticular biopsy" can be used in informed consent forms. See id.
95. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
96. See The Benson Study, supra note 16, at 471.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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discloses information verbally in parts, as opposed to an uninter-
rupted relay of information, a significant increase in comprehen-
sion occurs. 99
B. Proposed Changes to the Federal Guidelines
Changes must be made to the federal regulations to ensure that
mentally ill subjects provide a more meaningful consent. The fed-
eral guidelines should be amended to require that when the poten-
tial subject is a person with a mental disability affecting cognition,
such as schizophrenia, the informed consent process include a con-
versation between the investigator and the patient, with a third
party professional selected by the patient, instead of the current
short or long form. 100
1. Oral Conversation
The federal regulations should require a conversation between
physician-investigator and potential subject in order to preserve
the subject's autonomy and assist the patient in providing a mean-
ingful consent to research participation. This conversation should
be a dialogue that explains the elements of informed consent' 01 to
the potential subject in layman's terms.10 2 The general language
that the physician-investigator plans to use during the conversa-
tion, or an outline of the material to be covered, should be submit-
ted for IRB approval.
During the conversation, the physician should also explain to the
potential subject that the scientific interests will be superior to the
individual subject's therapeutic interest, and that the potential sub-
ject may or may not improve physically or mentally in the study.
The doctor must also clearly state that she will respect the choice of
the potential subject to participate or not, in order to give the sub-
99. See The MacArthur Study, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
100. To amend an administrative law, general notice of the proposed changes to the
rule must be published in the Federal Register. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 193 (1991). The Department of Justice, which issues the federal regula-
tions discussed, must allow interested parties the opportunity to participate in the
rule-making process. See id. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300v-1(b), requires that if the Federal
agency receives a recommendation from the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the "Com-
mission"), within sixty days the agency shall publish the recommendation in the Fed-
eral Register and "[p]rovide opportunity for interested person to submit written data,
views, and arguments with respect to adoption of the recommendation." Id.
101. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
102. Many informed consent documents contain complex scientific terms incom-
prehensible to the ordinary person. See Bartolo, supra note 5, at 200.
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ject a true idea of the differences between treatment received in a
research study and personal physician care. 10 3 Though there will
always be, with all subjects, a limit to comprehension because of
the unknowns of research, the conversation that explains the afore-
mentioned factors, and makes the various conditions of the experi-
ment clear to the subject, will help the subject to truly understand
the research.
Medical ethics experts believe, and research on the consent pro-
cess demonstrates, that obtaining informed consent through a con-
versation from a potential subject with impaired cognitive abilities
produces the highest rate of comprehension.'" Professor Jay Katz
discussed the need for a conversation between the physician-inves-
tigator and the prospective patient as necessary to preserve the pa-
tient's autonomy. 10 5 Some commentators believe that the federal
regulations fail to sufficiently mandate that investigators devote the
time to clearly explain the nature of the experiment to ensure that
patients fully understand the protocol and their own role in the
experiment.106
When the experiment enlists a person with cognitive disabilities,
the need for a conversation between the physician-investigator and
the potential subject becomes more important. Persons with schiz-
ophrenia, for example, face many problems when trying to compre-
hend the protocol of the research. 0 7 Their ability to understand
and reason is impaired. 0 8 However, their ability to understand in-
formation can improve from repeated presentation of information
that can occur during a conversation. 0 9
Some commentators acknowledge that researchers will be disin-
clined to have a conversation because it would take hours, possibly
even days, for the physician to be sure that the subject understands
the experiment.110 They argue that it will take more time to recruit
research subjects, and may take longer to complete research
103. See Katz, supra note 5, at 33-34.
104. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
105. See THE SILENT WORLD, supra note 5, at 130-64. Katz places this need for a
change in the informed consent process more upon the alteration in the mindsets of
the physician-investigators than on the actual federal regulations themselves. See
Goldner, supra note 5, at 115.
106. See Katz, supra note 5, at 24-25. A member of Bartolo's IRB believed that
true informed consent involved a conversation over many hours, and even days. See
Bartolo, supra note 5, at 206.
107. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
110. See Katz, supra note 5, at 36-37.
INFORMED CONSENT
projects."' When research involves human subjects, however, it
should be more important that the subject's autonomy is respected,
not that the recruitment process occurs quickly. Nonetheless, as
researchers become more familiar with obtaining informed consent
through a conversation, the researcher may become more adept at
clearly and succinctly presenting the necessary information to the
subject, thereby reducing the amount of time spent.
In addition, the long term benefits of preserving each individ-
ual's autonomy outweigh the short term risks of not completing a
study. Informed consent means that each person has a right to de-
cide what should be done with his or her own body. This right
cannot be sacrificed simply because it takes too long to accomplish.
2. Third Party Present at the Informed Consent Sessions of a
Mentally Ill Person
The current federal regulations state that when research involves
vulnerable subjects, "[c]onsideration shall be given to the inclusion
of one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and ex-
perienced with these subjects. 11 2 The statute does not specify that
this third person must possess knowledge about the mental illness
of the subject when the mental illness impairs the subject's ability
to provide meaningful informed consent. 1 3 The regulations also
state that the IRB "may, in its discretion" ask people with "compe-
tence" in a certain area to help review issues beyond the expertise
of the IRB members, but these people may not vote with the
IRB." 4 The regulations create many optional, ambiguous safe-
guards for mentally ill persons. The regulations should mandate
that when the potential research subject has a mental disorder that
is known to affect cognition, such as schizophrenia," 5 a third per-
son unaffiliated with the study, yet experienced in working with
111. See id.
112. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
113. See id. But see § 46.204 which requires an Ethical Advisory Board to be estab-
lished as an additional protection for person as subjects in research involving preg-
nant women and fetuses. Also see § 46.304 which mandates that when research
involves prisoners as subject, at least one member of the IRB must be a prisoner or
prisoner representative, as an additional protection.
In fact, at a recent conference of IRB members, an informal and scientific poll of
audience members revealed that only two or three members of an IRB had required a
third person participate in the informed consent process. John A. Robertson, Taking
Consent Seriously: IRB Intervention in the Consent Process, 4 IRB 1 (1982).
114. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(f).
115. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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mentally ill individuals, be present at the informed consent
sessions.
The federal regulations provide that witnesses may be present
during the informed consent process," 6 but the regulations do not
define "witness." The witness should be someone who possesses a
medical background and experience in the mental illness of the po-
tential-subject. The witness should not be one of the physician-
investigators, nor a person involved in the study. Preferably, it
would be the potential subject's personal psychiatrist. If that is not
possible, because the potential subject does not have a personal
physician or her personal physician is a part of the study, then the
witness should be a mental health care worker who is disinterested
in the study.' 17
A third party knowledgeable about the mental disorder present
at the informed consent process is important for several reasons.
Schizophrenics show decreased comprehension of information
compared to non-mentally ill persons." 8 In addition, the cognitive
abilities of a person with schizophrenia can vary from patient to
patient and from time to time." 9 The use of a third party investiga-
tor can result in increased delivery of high-quality information and
greater comprehension of information by the prospective sub-
ject.12 0 The third party will be present to examine the current
mental state of the subject to determine whether the patient under-
stands the informed consent process at that time.
The subject should select the third party in order to reduce the
invasion of the prospective subject's privacy.' The third party
should not be defined as an authoritative figure that "permits" the
prospective patient to participate in the study. If the third party
possessed this power, the autonomy of the subject would be
diminished.122
116. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
117. Disinterested in the study means a person who is not a part of or participating
as a physician-investigator in that particular research experiment. However, it should
be okay for the witness to be a member of the institution at which the research is
conducted if the potential subject chooses to work with such person.
118. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
121. See LEVINE, supra note 5, at 131.
122. Having a third party overseer present is an invasion of privacy and should not
be imposed frivolously. See LEVINE, supra note 5, at 131. A study by Stanley and
Stanley concluded that since an overestimation of a mentally ill person's incompe-
tence exists, paternalistic practices have been adopted that are detrimental to the in-
terest of mentally ill person. See id. at 265. "Unwarranted deprivation of their
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A family member or friend should also be permitted to attend
during the conversation if the patient so requests, but a family
member or friend alone cannot fill the role of a mental health care
worker or physician. It is more likely that a person with a medical
background will be familiar with the terminology used to describe
the research protocol and aware of the differences between thera-
peutic and non-therapeutic research. Family members may not
possess the ability to understand the technical language present in
an informed consent form. The knowledge possessed by the third
party can help to ensure that the potential subject truly under-
stands the study and provides meaningful consent.
Since potential subjects may not understand medical terms that
appear on a consent form,'23 a third party can help explain to the
patient what the medical terms mean in layman's terms. Also, the
third party can ask questions about the risks and benefits of the
study that the investigator, though ethically bound to reveal, might
fail to reveal.'24 Investigators, wittingly or unwittingly, often em-
phasize the therapeutic aspects of their study, while downplaying
the scientific aspects, and omitting material information about the
risks, benefits, and procedures. 125 The third party, because he/she
is knowledgeable in the area of cognitive inabilities of mentally ill
persons, can help ensure that the proper information about the
study is effectively communicated to the subject. 126 A person
chiefly concerned about the subject will be prepared to inquire
about the side effects and convey the true implications of the pro-
tocol, even if the investigator attempts to minimize them.
autonomy and decision-making authority is an affront to their dignity; moreover, it
lowers their self-esteem." Id.
123. See Sara L. Lawson & Helen M. Adamson, Informed Consent Readability:
Subject Understanding of 15 Common Form Phrases,IRB, Sept.-Dec. 1995, at 16-18.
This study used common words from informed consent forms to discover if consent
forms contain language that people understand. See id. The authors, through a writ-
ten survey, presented subjects with a written survey that presented a term in a sen-
tence and then asked the subject to define the word. See id. at 17. The study found
that in particular, medical and clinical terms should not be used in a consent form
without further explanation. See id. "The results show that research subjects have
poor or incomplete understanding of medical and research terminology." Id. at 17-18.
See also William C. Waggoner & Diane M. Mayo, Who Understands? A Survey of 25
Words of Phrases Commonly Used in Proposed Clinial Research Consent Forms,
IRB, Jan.-Feb. (1995) at 6-10 (finding a lack of understanding of more than fifty terms
from consent forms).
124. See Katz, supra note 5 at 25; Sandra L. Titus & Moira A. Keane, Do You
Understand?: An Ethical Assessment of Researchers' Description of the Consenting
Process, The J. of Clinical Ethics, 61-62, 64 (Spring 1996).
125. See The Benson Study, supra note 16 at 471-72.
126. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Subjects in research experiments mistakenly may conclude that
the experiment is conducted solely for their personal benefit. 127
Often potential subjects perceive the experiment in therapeutic
terms as a means to provide personal medical help.128 A third
party should make clear to the patient that the patient's individual
needs may be secondary to the experiment.
Some scholars support the basic idea of having available a third
person present to provide additional safeguards for mentally ill
persons.129 One scholar proposed that the process of obtaining in-
formed consent include a suggestion that the prospective subject
might wish to discuss the proposed research with a trusted advisor,
particularly if factors exist that limit the prospective subject's ca-
pacity for comprehension.130 The advisor should be the person's
doctor who occupies no role in the experiment, or another physi-
cian not involved if the patient has no personal physician. 131 The
prospective patient could also consult with another professional
advisor, minister or a friend. 32 Another commentator suggests as-
signing a "subject educator" to each research subject to assist dur-
ing each phase of informed consent, and a "subject advocate" to
oversee that experiment for unanticipated risks if the experiment
involves more than minimal risk. 133
An argument researchers might put forth against this proposal is
that the advocate will have a built-in aversion to using mentally ill
persons as research subjects, and that therefore no informed con-
sent session will ever satisfy the third party. If the third party is a
doctor or mental health care worker, however, the person will be
aware of the benefits derived from proper experimentation with
human subjects. Another complaint is that it already takes too
long to complete experiments,3 and that this added requirement
will further hinder research. Still others argue that increasing re-
127. See Benson Study, supra note 16 at 471-72.
128. See id.
129. See LEVINE, supra note 5, at 90-91, 11-12; Ryan, supra note 6, at 373.
130. See LEVINE, supra note 5, at 111-112.
131. See id.
132. See id. A community consultation, which consists of gathering groups of sub-
jects to discuss the research's protocol, provides the subjects with the support of each
other. See id. at 91.
133. See Ryan, supra note, 6 at 373.
134. "[S]cientists complain that it may take over six months to have a protocol ap-
proved . ... The [IRB] committee has been described to me as cumbersome and
obstructive to research." Bartolo, supra note 5, at 239. The federal regulations have
"throttled research into many aspects of human psychology without quite killing it
off." Morton Hunt, Research Through Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1982, at sec. 6
pg. 94; See Willwerth, Tinkering with Madness, supra note 3, at 40.
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quirements such as having a third party present at the informed
consent session will decrease research on mental illness and will
hurt schizophrenics in the long run.135 Stopping research and slow-
ing down research, however, are two different effects. Stopping re-
search means that no research at all will be done to study mental
illnesses like schizophrenia. When research is slowed down, how-
ever, the illness is still studied, and clinical progress may still be
made while respecting each subject's autonomy.
C. The Importance of Institutional Review Boards
Institutional Review Boards occupy the important role of ap-
proving and monitoring standards for informed consent. 136 How-
ever, the regulations regarding IRBs have several shortcomings for
guarding the autonomy of persons with mental illnesses. A major
drawback of IRBs is that they often are largely composed of col-
leagues of the institution's researchers. 137 This is problematic for
informed consent because members of the IRB may not hold re-
searchers to a measurement of consent and disclosure if that mea-
surement has impeded the study, thereby affecting the standing of
the researcher.138 Even IRB members who hold positions outside
the institution may not hold the researchers to a proper
standard. 139
Another complaint set forth about IRBs is that the members of
the IRBs rarely directly observe the informed consent process in
research protocols. 140 The IRBs have the authority to "observe or
have a third-party observe the consent process and the re-
135. See LEVINE, supra note 5, at 265 ("excessive bureaucratic procedural require-
ments designed to protect the mentally ill are likely to turn investigators away from
their efforts to develop more efficacious therapy for this group and focus on goals that
may be accomplished with fewer bureaucratic encumbrances.").
136. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
137. See Katz, supra note 5, at 39-42.
138. In Bartolo's biography of his four years on an IRB he noted that he, unlike
almost all of the other IRB members, was not economically dependent on the institu-
tion. See Bartolo, supra note 5, at 200. He felt comfortable taking potshots without
risking his standing in the institution. See id. A former IRB member recounted that
he believed the members of the IRB were not satisfied with some of the informed
consent forms, but approved the forms because they were important to the physician-
investigator's work, which made the work important to the hospital. See id.
139. Outsiders appointed to serve on the IRB may not be truly disinterested be-
cause there are no controls on the selection process to ensure that these outsiders are
not simply friends of trustees of the institution. See Harold Edgar & David J. Roth-
man, The Institutional Review Board and Beyond: Future Challenges to the Ethics of
Human Experimentation, 73 Milbank Q. 489, 492 (1995).
140. See id. at 493; Nicholas A. Cristakis, Should IRBs Monitor Research More
Strictly?, IRB 8, 9 (Mar.-Apr. 1988); Robertson, supra note 115,. at 1.
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search,' 141 but very few do so.142 As a result, the time the IRBs
spend approving the informed consent form does not ensure that
subjects understand the words on the form or provide meaningful
consent.
143
By mandating a conversation with a third party present during
the informed consent process, the federal regulations create in-
creased safeguards ensuring that the informed consent process is
meaningful for the potential subject. Informed consent sessions
will be observed and monitored better. The IRB may wish to have
a list of medical workers familiar with mental illnesses to serve as
third-parties if the potential subject does not choose a personal
physician and does not know a health care worker to serve as a
third party. By looking over the proposed language that the physi-
cian-investigator will use during his conversation with the potential
subject, the IRB can provide feedback regarding the language's
clarity and comprehensiveness. This task may require more time
spent by the IRB on improving the informed consent process, but
it is a necessary expenditure to ensure that potential subjects can
provide true consent. As a result, the IRB can better fulfill its role
as a protector of human research subject autonomy by ensuring
that the informed consent process elicits a meaningful consent
from the potential subject.
Conclusion
Past experiments and present day studies illustrate that the cur-
rent regulations on informed consent do not adequately ensure
that each subject can provide an informed and understanding deci-
sion to participate in an experiment. To ensure that persons with
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia provide true informed con-
sent when they are research subjects, the federal regulations must
be amended. A conversation between the researcher and the po-
tential subject enables a person with cognitive impairments associ-
ated with schizophrenia to better comprehend the nature of the
research protocol and the risks and benefits of participating as a
141. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e).
142. A study conducted for the government found that "63% of IRBs surveyed
never designated representatives to observe the manner in which a research project is
being conducted." Cristakis, supra note 140, at 1 (citing R.A. Cooke & A.S. Tannen-
baum, A Survey of Institutional Review Boards and Research Involving Human Sub-
jects in, Report and Recommendations regarding Institutional Review Boards
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH, (1978) 1.1-1.310, 1.205, 1.207.
143. See Robertson, supra note 115.
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research subject. The presence of a third party facilitates the com-
prehension of this information. The autonomy of all subjects, espe-
cially those most vulnerable to misunderstanding the informed
consent process, is too important to undercut for the achievement
of short term research goals.
AS
